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PERSON AND PERSONALITY.

WHAT we call personality constitutes the distinctive feature of a person, and a person is a human being with a concrete and definite individuality in contrast to lower creatures such as brute animals. Accordingly we understand by personality all the several features of a man's individual existence, including his bodily appearance, his habits and his character; and a man evinces his superiority over beasts not only by his rationality, his faculty of thinking, but also and mainly by his moral qualities, by responsibility. Personality therefore is prized highest among all the good things to be met in the field of our experience. We respect, or at least ought to respect, personality in others, and our own personality is a sacred trust which implies weighty and high duties.

The possessions which belong to man, his goods and chattels and bank account are external to him, they are his property, they are what he has, and holds and controls, but his personality is the man himself, and it is but natural that he wants to be just such a man as he is. Heredity, tradition and his own experience have shaped his character, and his character finds expression in his will. Therefore a man might like to change places with others, he might be glad to change fortunes, position in life, fame, family relations and even name, but he would be loath to change his personality. Everybody clings to his own self. This truth is expressed by Goethe in an epigram published in his *Westöstlicher Divan* (VIII) as follows:

“Volk und Knecht und Ueberwinder,
 Sie gestehn zu jeder Zeit;
 Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
 Sei nur die Persönlichkeit.
 Jedes Leben sei zu führen,
 Wenn man sich nur nicht vermisst,
 Alles könne man verlieren
 Wenn man bliebe was man ist.”

[Folks and slaves and he who conquers,
 They confess howe'er it be,
 Highest bliss for which man hankers
 Is his personality.
 Any life he rather chooseth
 If himself he would not miss,
 Anything he gladly loseth
 If he stays just what he is.—Tr. by P. C.]

Schopenhauer¹ describes this habitual clinging to one's own personality more tersely in two lines, thus:

“Mir geht nun auf der Welt nichts über mich;
 Denn Gott ist Gott, und ich bin ich.”

[Naught can surpass me, replace or supply,
 For God is God, and I am I.]

With a good deal of sarcasm the same idea echoes through the lines of Wilhelm Busch,² the famous German humorist, who says of the evil-doer:

“Auch hat er ein höchst verrucht Gelüst,
 Grad' so zu sein wie er eben ist.”

[The bad one maliciously listeth, you see,
 Just such a one as he is, to be.]

¹ Schopenhauer puts this rhyme into the mouth of Thrasymachos, one of his disputants in a dialogue. See his *Panerga und Paralipomena*, Vol. II; *Kleine dialogische Schlussbelustigung* of the chapter *Zur Lehre von der Unzerstörbarkeit unseres wahren Wesens durch den Tod*.

² See the writer's translation of *Edward's Dream* by Wilhelm Busch (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1909).

From all this it becomes apparent what an important idea the concept personality is, and for this reason mystics have found here a wide field for their theories and for many vagaries.

The problem of personality is really the problem of man in his individual and particular idiosyncrasy, and modern psychology shows how personality, the very self of man, is a rich complex of many noble qualities, the quintessence of nature's work at its best, and the highest efflorescence of the evolution of life. It incorporates volitions, ideas, and aspirations systematized into a unit by self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is a distinct prerogative of man. Lower creatures are sentient, the higher brute animals conscious, but man alone is self-conscious. He forms an idea of himself, and this idea of himself raises him above his bodily and temporary existence. It objectifies his own self and makes it possible that man can reflect upon himself and his own actions. He not only feels his own existence as do the higher animals, but he can say "I" and refers to himself as "me." He can speak of himself, he can compare himself with others, and he can judge himself. This makes it possible for him to wish to be different, and what Goethe says in his epigram is true enough of the average man, we might say of the natural man, but the higher man is not satisfied with his character, he aspires to some better mode of existence. He endeavors to grow better and to improve himself.

In the growth of evolution self-consciousness rises as a new factor which makes it possible for the pace of progress, of intellectual and moral advance, to be greatly accelerated. The wish to know more and to be better and nobler gradually hardens into a stern determination and finally overrules the lower instincts inherited from a less cultured past.

A man who tries to do the right thing whenever he is confronted with duties is called "responsible" and the very thought that conscious endeavor is expected of him strengthens his responsibility. In this way man forms an ideal of what he ought to do and what he ought to be; and under the guidance of this ideal he can by conscious concentration work out the nobler potentialities of his self.

The German poet Friedrich Rückert says:

"Vor Jedem steht ein Bild
Des, das er werden soll,
Und eh' er es nicht ist,
Wird nicht sein Friede voll."

[The type he ought to be
Each one bears in his mind,
Until that be attained
He never peace will find.—Tr. by P. C.]

Responsibility is the divine stamp of man, the stamp of his nobility and of his dignity. Responsibility presupposes that a person is not like a brute which blindly obeys its instincts, but that he can restrain himself; that he does not heedlessly rush into committing a deed, but that he can deliberate and choose. Thus he does not depend upon the present only, but can take into consideration the eventualities of the future. He can make his action an expression, not of the fleeting moment, but of his entire character; he may let the better, though more quiet motives have a chance to assert themselves against the lower impulses, even though these are louder and at times more vigorous. In a word responsibility presupposes free will guided by moral principles, which means that we expect a person to make his decisions with the good intention of doing the right thing.

Briefly stated we say: a person is a human being, which means, a rational creature, endowed with conscience and

capable of acting on his own free will so that he can be held responsible for his deeds. Accordingly there are these four indispensable features in a person, rationality, conscience, responsibility and free will.

* * *

Free will and determinism were formerly held to be irreconcilable, especially in the old theological disputations, but the difficulty is *de facto* a pseudo-problem.³ It is based upon a confusion of the ideas of compulsion and determinedness. Freedom of will does not mean that the will is undetermined and indeterminable, a matter of haphazard chance like a throw of dice, but that it is *free to act according to its own nature*. An act of free will is the result neither of coercion nor of chance, but the necessary outcome of a free, that is to say an unhampered, decision, in which the determinant is the actor's own character.

He only can imagine that free actions in order to be truly free, are not, nor ought they be, determined by causation, who conceives of causation as a law in the sense of an enactment which enforces certain rules, as a government would enforce its decrees through the power of police forces. But like all uniformities of nature, causation is called a law only in an allegorical sense. The so-called "laws of nature" and "the law of causation" are descriptions of how things behave under given conditions, and therefore they had better be called "uniformities." If without being compelled by any one or any outside power, I act in such a way as to acknowledge the deed to be my own, it is called an act of my own free will, which being of a definite kind and following definite principles, will under given conditions result in definite actions.

The same is true of unconscious nature. The path of

³We have discussed it on former occasions in *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 191-196; *The Soul of Man*, pp. 389-397; *The Ethical Problem*, pp. 45-47, and *passim*.

a comet is determined according to the law of gravitation through its mass, which under definite conditions takes a definite course with a definite velocity. The nature of the comet is such as to behave in this way. The law of gravitation does not exercise the function of a cosmic police, it possesses no power and exercises no compulsion. It is merely a formula which describes the action of gravity. If a comet could speak it would declare that it pursues a certain direction because it wants to go there.

An act of free will is not an arbitrary deed which would form an exception to the law of cause and effect. An act of free will is as much determined by conditions as any other event, but the decisive factor in an act of free will is not any extraneous circumstance, but the character of the acting person. To state it briefly, we define "free will" as a will unimpeded by any compulsion.

An act of free will characterizes the person who performs it; it indicates what kind of a man he is. An act done under compulsion is foreign to the actor, and he can not be held accountable for it.

A person is expected to know that he has to stand by his deeds, and whenever he acts of his own free will he recognizes his deeds as his own, and thereby acquires the feeling of responsibility. A man in whom the feeling of responsibility is strong will be careful so to act as not to regret or repent his actions afterwards.

The good intention of doing the right thing develops naturally and automatically in such a social being as man; it is called "conscience," which in a word may be described as the moral instinct of man.

Personality does not originate in isolation; every person is a member of a social body, of a family, a tribe, of social conditions, of a nation, of mankind, and a feeling of interdependence among all members of a society is present in every one of them from the beginning. Even a pack of

wolves or dingos is animated in the chase by a common will, and this common will becomes a motive of action, which in human society assumes the authority of duty, of what a man ought to do in the interest of all. The common will of a community develops instinctively through the demands made on the members of a social group. These demands, if not spontaneously attended to, are enforced by a consensus which finds a different expression in different stages of social development. The assent which an individual more or less consciously gives to the justice of the common will gradually takes shape in what is called conscience.⁴

* * *

Man associates all the motives of actions which are an expression of his own character with the idea of his self and speaks of himself as "I" and "me." He says, "This concerns *me*, *I* do this, *I* will this, *I* love this, *I* hate that;" and this little pronoun "I," called by philosophers with the Latin name "ego," becomes the center round which cluster all these notions of our own yearnings and intentions, likes and dislikes, preferences and aversions, hopes and aspirations. In itself the word "I" is as empty as are all abstract terms, but how replete it is to each of us, containing all that constitutes the very core of our souls!

The contents of this term "I" or the "ego" which covers our continuous existence from the cradle to the grave, is our inmost being, our self, our personality; what we think and what we feel is the only thing that is truly ours, and we quote again a verse from Goethe who expresses this truth in poetic form thus:

"Ich weiss, dass mir nichts angehört
Als der Gedanke der ungestört

⁴For a description of the nature and origin of conscience, see the writer's *Ethical Problem*, pp. 119-124. The difference between the will of all and the common will is treated in *The Nature of the State*, pp. 15-16.

Aus meiner Seele will fließen,
 Und jeder günstige Augenblick,
 Den mich ein liebendes Geschick
 Von Grund aus lässt genießen."

[I know that naught belongs to me
 Except the thought that light and free
 Out of my soul is flowing;
 Also of joy each moment rare
 Which my good fortune kind and fair
 Upon me is bestowing!]

Our personality is and ought to be dear to us, and whatever may befall we ought to regard it as a sacred trust, and to keep inviolate its integrity, dignity, and honor our supreme duty. All other cares and responsibilities we may have are subservient to our main task in life, which is the progressive unfoldment, the constant enhancement and ennoblement of our self. Everything is secondary so long as we remain faithful to the ideal of our personality.

The word "person" is to a great extent a synonym of the word "soul," the main difference being that "person" is more comprehensive; for it denotes not only the essential but also the unessential and purely accidental features of man's individual existence. When we speak of man's personality we include his bodily appearance, and in fact think of it first, but we think of it as the expression of the soul that stirs behind it. We think of a man's personality as his face and stature, but the features and figure of a person are remembered as reflecting his character which is the guiding principle of his life.

Other nations have coined their words for personality according to its most obvious feature, the bodily appearance. In Chinese the word person is 身, *shan*, which also means "body" and was originally the picture of the figure of a man. In Pali, the language of the sacred books of the Buddhists, "person" is called by a compound word

namo-rupa, which literally translated means "name [and] form." To the people of Pali speech the personality of a man was first of all his name, and then his bodily appearance as it assumed a material form; but it comprises not only the name and form but also his past memories, the history of his life, his individual tastes, his inclinations, in a word, his character. As a man was known by a special name and recognized by his features and corporeal characteristics, these were considered as constituting his personality, or "name-form," *namo-rupa*.

* * *

The physiological problem of personality touches upon the larger problem of the one and the many. We mean by a person a certain unit, yet this unit is not an unchangeable monad, but the complicated system of a rich manifold. Several organs and their functions have been combined into a higher unity by organization. Physiological data as to the origin and development of personality teach us that the unit is due to a unification. It is the product of the cooperative tendency of an organism, of a complex which has to act in unison.

An organism grows. Every animal has developed from a cell by multiplication and all its parts are differentiated by a division of labor. The archetype is preserved in all of them, every organ being adapted to the work allotted to it by the nature of circumstances. It is a matter of course therefore that all parts harmonize. The roots, stem, leaves, flowers and fruits of a plant show a certain agreement because they have all originated from the same pattern. They are mere modifications of the original design, and the various functions cooperate in the service of the whole.

The cooperation of parts in animal organisms is more systematized than in plants. The different organs of a

creature possessed of purpose, are so closely united that they must act in concert. They are no longer coordinated but subjected to a centralized government. The limbs are subservient to the purpose of the whole evinced in volitions which have their seat in the brain whence orders are issued for general cooperation. This systematization is carried to a still higher perfection in man, the rational animal who by the machinery of speech acquires the faculty of thinking in abstract terms, and thus is capable of testing his own concepts and reaches an objective comprehension of facts. Man learns to distinguish between truth and error, between right and wrong, between good and evil, and he is expected in his decision and deeds to use the best judgment of which he is capable.

Not all men are consistent; some vacillate to an extraordinary degree. But upon the whole, there is a general convergence of impulses in the mental makeup of everybody, which in spite of some contradictory tendencies produces a unity of volition and furnishes the basis of what may briefly be called character. All the doings and inclinations, the preferences and tastes of a man, are as much in agreement as are the roots, leaves, flowers and fruits of plants. There is a type which pervades the several parts, and this type reappears in the unification of the whole, where it effectually dominates the entire attitude and behavior of the individual. This is the keynote of a man's personality, and by a "man of personality" we mean a person whose character is clearly determined and well defined.

In a person the dominant feature is registered in his will but the will of intellectual persons is guided by the mind, which means that their decisions are influenced by rational deliberation.

Man's soul is like a commonwealth of sensations, notions, ideas, and other psychic functions. Man's will is

like a king within it. The will decides, the will acts, and the will is always inclined to assert itself irrespective of other considerations. A man of the lower type will follow the first impulse if it be strong enough at a given moment; but in a higher man the will is like a constitutional king who waits with his decision until he has taken counsel with his trusted minister of state, and has become assured of the general assent of the nation. A wise man refrains from rushing into acts. In him the first impulse is checked by some such thought as, "Wait, let me consider the consequences." The counsel which a ruler takes is comparable to the intellect, or the mind; and the higher mankind rises in the scale of evolution, the stronger grows this power of inhibition, resulting in what ethicists call "self-control" in consequence of which the influence of the mental process of deliberation increases.

The intellect is not a faculty any more than is the will, but it is a collective name for the sum total of experiences as arranged in a systematic order. There is no special faculty called the will. By will psychologists understand "the tendency to pass into act." A motor idea when stimulated one way or another, innervates its respective set of muscles and makes them contract thus serving the purpose of the intention, and the tension preceding the act, at the moment of its release, is called "will." But it is essential that the process should not be purely physiological but must pass into consciousness—the domain of psychology—while touching the motor idea. In order to render an act of the will complete, the motor idea should be associated with the ego conception expressed in the word "I" which, as it were, sanctions its passing into act by thinking "I will it." Should a stimulus leading to a muscular motion be purely physiological, the process would not be an act of the will, but a mere reflex action.

Though the will is not a faculty we can speak of the

attitude of the ego consciousness when allowing motor ideas to pass into act, as "the will."

The pragmatic view, so fashionable now, describes the actual state of things on the lower plane of mankind. Its founder has taken a dislike to the intellect and has opened a campaign against what he calls "vicious intellectualism." Prof. William James is satisfied to point out the power of "the will to believe," but he neglects to inquire into the rare cases of the influence of the still small voice of the intellect which modifies and even radically changes the belief, yea the character of a man in spite of his will. As a psychology, pragmatism presents us with a correct, or fairly correct, picture of the average type of man, but as a philosophy it is a failure because it treats the average as the standard and overlooks the existence of a higher type.

In the realm of science the supremacy of the will is sheer atavism, for it represents man as he has just emerged from brute existence; when man ceases to be a slave of his instincts, a child of blind impulses, when he begins to be influenced by his intellect, when he begins to learn the lessons of life, when he forms ideals and aspires for higher aims, when he considers his highest duty to be self-education, and an actualization of his higher potentialities, when he feels responsibilities—then only does he become a person in the full sense of the word.

* * *

The history of the word "person" is of great interest. To be sure the etymology is absolutely unknown, for the common derivation of classical tradition from *personare*, to sound through, mentioned by Gellius (V, 7) is philologically impossible on account of the different quantity of the *o*. But we know positively that *persona* was a term of the stage denoting the mask of an actor, the part he played, the rôle which he learned by heart—thoughts expressed in words accompanied by definite actions.

It has become customary during the last century to study the history of an idea in order to understand both its origin and meaning, and in this sense the late Professor Trendelenburg has approached the problem of the significance of personality. He has collected all particulars on the etymology of the term, its historical interrelation with the Greek *πρόσωπον* (i. e., face), its possible derivation from *per-se-una*, "that which is one by itself," or its formation by the suffix *ona*, as *per-se-ona*, "that which is self-containing," in analogy to *Pomona*, the fruit-containing one (the goddess of orchards), *Bellona*, the goddess of war, *matrona*, etc. Masculine analogies to nouns in *-ona* are *patronus* and *colonus*. Trendelenburg also alludes to the theological idea of the Trinity as one substance in three persons, etc. In a word, he offers in this essay a good collection of the most essential philological and etymological data which have reference to the formation and interpretation of the word "person."

Trendelenburg's essay "On the History of the Word Person" remained buried among other posthumous papers for many years and has only recently been published.⁵ In the meantime Dr. Otto Gierke, professor of German Civil and State Law at the University of Berlin, has set forth for juridical purposes a doctrine as to the nature of person, which he calls the "organic theory." Under this he subsumes not only living individuals but also juridical persons, and he speaks of person in this sense as "a life unit which withdraws itself absolutely from sense perceptions." He adds, "And even his [an actual man's] personality is an attribute attached to this invisible unit which is simply deduced from its effects. It is a crude error to think that a separate personality can be seen with bodily eyes."⁶

Prof. Sigmund Schlossmann of Kiel takes issue with

⁵ An English translation of the essay appears on another page in the present number of *The Monist*.

⁶ *Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände; Rektoratsrede, 1902, p. 18.*

this organic theory and going to the other extreme criticises it as a nuisance (*Schädling*) which has burdened jurisprudence with the fictitious existence of a juridical agent endowed with legal functions, and ought to be set aside. In a scholarly essay entitled *Persona und πρόσωπον*, Professor Schlossmann has collected almost all the philological material on hand and fulminates his anathema against Gierke's view. He certainly succeeds in proving that the Latin *persona* is not a translation of the Greek *prosopon*, but that both words have developed independently into the meaning of person, influencing each other as two electric currents affect each other by induction (*loc. cit.*, p. 99). In truth the word acquired the meaning of person only under the influence of the Latin conception of *persona*, and this was done not on the ground of juridical considerations but of theological discussion on the nature of the Trinity. Wherever *prosopon* is used in the sense of *persona*, or *aprosopos* in the sense of not having a *persona*, we can point out an actual or highly probable influence of Latin thought upon the author who thus uses these words. Professor Schlossmann shows that Dionysius of Halicarnassus had become accustomed to this convenient term during a sojourn at Rome of more than twenty years. Herennius Modestinus, however, was practically a Roman who wrote in Greek, and so his use of *prosopon* in the sense of *persona* may be regarded as a Latinism.⁷

The use of the Greek *prosopon* has unquestionably been influenced by the Hebrew *panim*,⁸ where the word is used in a loose sense frequently merely as a preposition "in the face of," which simply means "in front of." This use of

⁷ See Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

⁸ פָּנִים. It is derived from פָּנָה which means "to turn." While the Hebrew term is a plural tantum it is noteworthy that the Greek expression "in the face of" is always used in the singular. Cf. Luke ii. 31; x. 1. For further passages see Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 53 ff., especially p. 55.

prosopon is late and does not antedate Christianity, but can be directly traced to quotations from the Septuagint.

In theology the term *hypostasis*, Latin *substantia*, "that which underlies," was used to denote the nature of the three aspects of the Trinity by the Latin Church Fathers, especially Tertullian who replaced this neo-Platonic term by *persona*. And here, in spite of the learned authority of Harnack and his followers,⁹ Professor Schlossmann is right who says that Tertullian did not introduce the term *persona* from the nomenclature of jurisprudence, because it did not exist as such, or at least was used only sporadically. In fact there are only two places in which *persona* is used in a sense approaching our modern conception of a juridical person. These are found in Frontinus who speaks of *persona coloniae*, thus personifying a Roman colony, and in Agenius Urbicus who speaks of *personae publicae*, also called *coloniae*, which hold definite places assigned to them and are commonly named *praefecturae*.¹⁰

On the other hand, the use of *persona* in the modern sense as a person (not as a mask on the stage) is quite old and occurs as early as in Plautus (*Persa*, 783) where Dor-

⁹ Harnack is supported by Loofs, *Realencyc. f. d. prot. Theol.*, IV, p. 40. Bethune-Baker, "The Meaning of Homousios, in the Constantinopolitan Creed" in *Texts and Studies*, Vol. VII, pp. 21 ff.; Hatch, *Griechentum und Christentum* (Ger. tr. by E. Preuschen), p. 206 ff. He is opposed by Esser in Wetzer and Welte's *Kirchenlex.*, XI², p. 142, 2; Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, II², p. 388, and Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I, p. 87, and by Schlossmann himself, from whom we quote this bibliographic note.

¹⁰ The passage from Frontinus (De contr. agr. II in *Röm. Feldmesser*, by Blume, Lachmann and Rudorff, I, pp. 54, 23) reads: "Est alia inscriptio quae—inscriptur 'Silva pascua' aut 'Fundus Septicianus, coloniae Augustae Concordiae.' Haec inscriptio videtur ad personam coloniae ipsius pertinere neque ullo modo abalienari potest a republica."

The passage in Agenius (8, 6; *loc. cit.*, I, p. 16) reads: "Quaedam loca feruntur ad publicam personam attinere, nam personae publicae etiam coloniae appellantur. Quae habent assignata in alienis finibus quaedam loca, quae solemus praefecturas appellare. Harum praefectarum proprietates manifeste ad colonos pertinent—sunt et aliae proprietates quae municipiis a principibus sunt concessae."

Another later quotation from Ulpianus (Dig. IV, 2, 9, 1) has been used for the same purpose but is less convincing. We shall quote it nevertheless. It reads: "et ideo si singularis sit persona, quae metum intulit vel populus vel curia vel collegium vel corpus, huic edicto locus erit."

dalus, one of the characters of the play, swears "at the Persian, at all the Persians, and in fact at all persons."¹¹ The explanation that *personas* might here mean the masks on the stage is too far fetched to be entertained. While the pun suggests the use of the word person, the passage proves that the word was then used in its present acceptance.

The juridical usage of person, however, is isolated in classical times, and does not appear elsewhere in juridical writings. Even in the *Institutiones* of Gaius, its use is not far from the common acceptance of the word, and we read for instance (*Inst.*, III, 14, 2) that "an inheritance not yet entered upon still maintains the place of the person not of the future heir, but of the deceased." Certainly Tertullian used the word *persona* in the popularly accepted meaning, and if he had introduced the term from jurisprudence he would have said so.

During the time of ecclesiastical controversies concerning the nature of the Trinity, the Latin Church insisted on the formula that God, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are three persons and one substance, and not until then were the words *prosopon* and *hypostasis* identified.

On the other hand the Greek idea *hypostasis* has influenced the conception of *persona* which appears mainly in the oldest definition of the word still extant as given by Boethius who introduces the term *substantia*, the Latin translation of *hypostasis*, saying:

"Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationalibus, substantiaque omnis natura est, nec in universalibus sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est igitur definitio: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia."

Other definitions, especially that of Cassiodorus, repeat

¹¹ See Schlossmann, *loc. cit.*, p. 15. The passage reads: "Qui illum Persam atque omnes Persas atque etiam omnes personas male di omnes perdant.

the same idea in somewhat different form: "Persona vero hominis est substantia rationalis individua suis proprietatibus a consubstantialibus caeteris segregata."

The identification of two different terms such as *hypostasis* or *substantia* and *persona* indicate the presence of two currents of thought, one philosophical the other mystico-religious, which were finally merged into one; but the differences blazed forth in the animosity of the *furor theologicus* recorded in ecclesiastical history. The differences continue even to the present time though they find other terms as exponents of two contradictory views.

The controversy was set at rest by repeated official declarations that the quarrel was purely verbal, and so we find both *prosopon* and *hypostasis* repeatedly used together with *ἡτοι* or *ἡγουν*, as if to emphasize that the two terms mean exactly the same. In Latin ecclesiastical manuscripts the two words are used synonymously in the same manner: *personae seu subsistentiae* or *personae vel subsistentiae*.¹²

According to Schlossmann the importance of the term *persona* in antiquity has been greatly exaggerated since it appears to have meant merely one who plays a part, so that the expression "slaves are not persons" simply meant that slaves played no part before the law, their rights were ignored by the law. It is noteworthy that the Greek *aprosopos* occurs in Theophilus who has obviously been influenced by the Roman usage of the word *persona*.

The history of the theological use of the term "person" certainly proves that the idea of personality with reference to the deity is rather late and leaves to those who object to the use of the term the excuse of being the result of

¹² Some theologians, for instance the Roman Diaconus Rusticus, in his *Disputatio contra Acephalos*, use *subsistentia* in place of the more common *substantia* in order to give more dignity to the term, which in its abbreviated form had ceased to mean "that which underlies" and was commonly used in the sense of "substance."

ecclesiastical quibbles, in which two such different terms as *hypostasis* which means a substratum and *persona* which means an individual being, have for insufficient reasons been finally declared identical.

Prof. F. Max Müller wrote a short essay on the same subject which he has published under the title *Persona*.¹³ It is a most interesting and instructive sketch pointing out that *persona* originally meant the mask of an actor and then the part he played, the words he had to say on the stage, and the actions which he had to perform.

There is, however, one point in which Max Müller is mistaken. A person *is* the part which a man plays in life; he *is* the character which, as it were, he acts. His person manifests itself in the sentiments which sway him, in the deeds he performs and in the words he says. Our sentiments, thoughts, words and deeds form a harmonious whole, they constitute a systematic unity, and in this their totality they constitute our personality; they are our self. Every one of us plays his own part in life. He is the actor who acts himself. In other words he has not memorized a part which some one else has conceived and written down. He is the poet who improvises the rôle which under given situations he wants to have performed. The part which a man plays is of his own making. However, Max Müller conceives a person not as the part he plays, but as the actor only. He distinguishes between the two, and regards the part which a person plays in life as a performance that is foreign to him. While in real life a man is the part he plays in the world, the actor on the stage may be very different from it. For instance he who plays Judas Iscariot in the passion play at Oberammergau, may have nothing in common with the character of the betrayer of Jesus. Max Müller's view is dualistic. Following the speculations of the old Brahman Vedantism, he conceives of the soul as a

¹³ Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908.

metaphysical being behind our actual existence, as a thing-in-itself, a passive witness, and a mere spectator. We will let him explain his view in his own words. He says: "Let us remember that *persona* had two meanings, that it meant originally a mask, but that it soon came to be used as the name of the wearer of the mask. Knowing how many ambiguities of thought arose from this, we have a right to ask: Does our personality consist in the *persona* we are wearing, in our body, our thoughts, or does our true personality lie somewhere else? It may be that at times we so forget ourselves, our true Self, as to imagine that we are Romeo and Juliet, King Lear, or Prince Hamlet. Nor can we doubt that we are responsible each for his own *dramatis persona*, that we are hissed or applauded, punished or rewarded, according as we act the part allotted to us in this earthly drama, badly or well. But the time comes when we awake, when we feel that not only our flesh and our blood, but all that we have been able to feel, to think and to say, was outside our true self; that we were witnesses, not actors; and that before we can go home, we must take off our masks, standing like strangers on a strange stage, and wondering how for so long a time we did not perceive even within ourselves the simple distinction between *persona* and *persona*, between the mask and the wearer."

The truth is that if life is to be compared to a stage we play our own parts, and the characters which we represent exhibit our own personality. On the stage the actor behaves as his part demands; his part does not belong to him; the poet is responsible for it, not the actor who has learned it by heart and speaks it by rote. In actual existence the mask and the actor are one and the same; the parts we play are not foreign to us, as Max Müller claims, but they are the true and only expressions of our inmost being, of our personality.

We have seen that one's personality must to every one be higher than all his possessions, because it constitutes the man himself, the owner of all his earthly goods. Thus it is obvious that the worth of one's personality is not only more valuable than any property, but it is also different in kind. In the history of mankind the recognition of the dignity of personality shows itself in our legal and habitual notions of respect for human lives. It is considered a duty at any cost to save or rescue a man who is in danger of death, and in comparison to the jeopardy of human life all commercial goods and their values are deemed a negligible quantity.

Kant in his definition of personality declares that a person should always be considered as an end in itself, and this holds good for our own person as in the case of other persons with whom we are dealing.

We ask now, (1) What is the nature of this exceptional place we assign to personality? (2) Is every personality of equal dignity? and if not, this leads to (3) What is the objective standard of the worth of personality?

The first question is answered when we remember what personality is. A person is an individual that is possessed of reason. It is a social being, which means that it is a member of a community, endowed with speech as the means of a communication of thought, and conscious of rights as well as duties, capable of pursuing purposes, and responsible for its actions.

If we adopt the old Brahman idea as advocated by Max Müller we would be compelled to believe that what we call "person" is a mysterious agent behind all the characteristics and deeds of a personality. If that were truly so all persons would be of equal value, for they are mere spectators, and what they are or do in life concerns them as little as the actor can be held personally responsible for the crimes he commits on the stage when performing the

part assigned to him. Buddhism denied the Brahman view of the metaphysical nature of the self, and modern psychology, sometimes erroneously called the psychology without a soul, follows the same line of argument in denying the existence of a soul in itself. According to this view a person consists of his thoughts and volitions. He is not the owner of his qualities but the sum total of all of them. The Brahman view has originated through a philosophical mistake which hypostasizes the idea of the thing and treats it as a thing in itself. It is a common habit to say that the tree has roots, a trunk, foliage, blossoms and fruit, while in fact the tree consists of its parts. We say a table has legs, and a top; that a wagon has wheels, a body and a tongue; but we ought to say that these objects consist of their several parts. They are combinations, and this very combination makes the thing what it is. Lowell says:

“Roots, wood, bark and leaves, singly perfect may be,
But clapped hodge-podge together, they don't make a tree.”

The unity of a personality is of high importance, and according to conditions it is more or less significant. Sometimes the very systematic character of a personality adds to the value of a man's thoughts by giving them their proper setting and interrelation with other thoughts. However, the unity of a person is a unification and since a unification consists of qualities, we shall readily understand that a person is not a special being or essence but their harmonious combination in an organized form; and the worth of a personality can depend only on its character, its contents. We range one person higher than another if his character is superior, if his intelligence is higher, if his sentiments are more humane and refined.

The rationality of a person's mental operations means that his soul has become an incarnation of the world order, the universal logic of natural law, the eternal norm of ex-

istence, called in the terminology of Christian doctrines, the Logos. It includes the recognition of moral obligation, popularly called conscience, and constitutes the divinity of man which is forfeited only by those who by deeds prove that they themselves do not respect the dignity of personality in others, that for selfish reasons they would not shrink from taking the life of one of their fellow men.

When we consider the composite nature of personality we become aware of the fact that different persons are different in character and mental equipment. Thus they are not equal and their comparative worth can be measured by the general desirability of their moral and mental capacity together with a consideration of the strength, seriousness etc., of their intentions and volitions.

* * *

For an analysis of the nature of personality it is most indispensable to understand the part played by ideas in the economy of our mental life.

It is natural that, misled by the mode of language, we fall into the mistake of the ancient Brahmans in imagining that we have ideas. Though we consist of ideas, we objectify them and treat them as if they were commodities. We say that we adopt opinions as if we appropriated them. But the truth is the reverse. Ideas, opinions, or convictions take possession of us, sometimes against our will, which means against the conviction which we held before, or properly speaking which was in possession of our soul. Our soul is the battle-ground where conflicting views are waging a bitter warfare for the supremacy among many contrary volitions. Our mind is like a commonwealth inhabited by various ideas. These ideas combine and produce new ideas. At the same time, experience as well as intercommunication with others introduces immigrants. New ideas enter. Sometimes they are invaders, and if these immigrants are at variance with those ideas that are

in possession, parties are formed and a civil war arises until one side becomes dominant. When a powerful invader is victorious, we have an instance in which we become converts to a new conviction in spite of ourselves.

It is apparent that ideas lead a life of their own. They grow and develop. They migrate from soul to soul. They are transferred by the way of language and through writing. Ideas themselves originate, grow and change. In the course of their migration they become more or less modified and adapt themselves to new environments. They struggle among themselves. Some are victorious, others succumb; some are exterminated, others survive. They fit themselves into a system in which some of them take the lead while others remain subservient.

Ideas are the most potent factors in the history of mankind. Wherever they reside in human souls they are aglow with life and sentiment. But in their transmigration they may be conveyed by mechanical means in script; they may shrivel up into small inky letters on paper and in this shape they may lie concealed in unfeeling forms of dead matter. They may be incorporated in books or manuscripts or other symbols, and yet like grains of seed which fall into fertile land, they may revive whenever they impress themselves through the senses into the brain of a living being. Indeed ideas are wonderful things, for they are the vehicles of all spirituality. In order fully to understand our own personality we ought to be able to trace back the life of the ideas of which our souls are composed to their very origins, and to their most primitive original conditions which always start in sensation, or, broadly speaking, in making experience. They coalesce with and draw conclusions from previous experience, or react somehow on the impressions of the surrounding world, and in doing so they give meaning to life.

Without going astray or being fantastical we may com-

pare ideas to real persons. At least the idea we have of persons is after all the most appropriate simile we have to characterize their being. Think only of moral ideas, of ideals, of religious sentiments! They enter the soul of a man and take hold of his entire existence often in spite of his will. And what a profound truth lies in the dogma of resurrection! Jesus the Crucified has actually risen from the dead, and where two or three are gathered together in his name, he is present.

* * *

The behavior of ideas is rather impersonal, and we may characterize them as interpersonal existences. Lichtenberg, a contemporary of Kant, struck the right chord when he objected to the expression "I think," and claimed that we should say, "it is thinking" just as we say, "it is raining" or "it is snowing" or "it is thundering." It is a fallacy to imagine that there is a certain I, an ego who does the thinking. This is the old metaphysical mistake. The truth is that thoughts arise in living beings according to conditions. There is no ego that produces thoughts, but *thinking takes place*, and in the process of thinking, thoughts are shaped. We do not deny that the idea of the ego is a highly important contrivance in the household of nature to make thinking possible. But the ego is after all not the cause of our existence but the result and product of it.

What is the nature of the ego?

The ego represents the sum total and summary of the component parts of a person, and is used in this sense as a synonym for personality. The word "I" is a pronoun, a brief term which stands for a noun, and the pronoun "I" always stands for the speaking person. In itself, therefore, the "ego" is meaningless. It is a mere shorthand sign for the speaking person and its true content is determined by the personal characteristics which it denotes.

The ego identifies itself in different persons with different ideas which dominate the commonwealths of their souls. Ideas themselves however are representatives either of concrete things or classes of things, or of the interrelations among things, or of aspirations and plans to accomplish certain aims, and the value of ideas depends upon their significance, their range and applicability to real life, and above all upon their truth, which means the correctness with which they represent either objective reality or the right way of dealing with reality.

Accordingly there is unquestionably a standard for the value of ideas, and if of ideas, then also of man himself. The truer and clearer a set of ideas mirrors the world, the more valuable they are; and the more perfect a man's soul reflects existence as a law-ordained cosmos, the higher he ranges in the development of life.

* * *

We have seen that a person is a systematic arrangement of ideas, taking here ideas in the broadest sense of the word including sentiments, hopes and volitions. We have further seen that ideas are interpersonal beings migrating from soul to soul. We will now call attention to a subject very much neglected and frequently misunderstood, which is the part played by superpersonalities. In the development of mankind we frequently meet with institutions such as the church, the state, and also systematized sets of truths, such as the several sciences, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, etc. These systems of ideas, whether purely theoretical as the sciences, or whether incarnate in institution such as states, churches, etc., possess a life of their own. They are not limited to science, religion and politics but deal also with business and any other possible affairs. Every municipality has a character of its own, and the

same is true of business concerns, factories, corporations, societies and even clubs. They are, as it were, superpersonal presences which consist of persons and continue to preserve their character even when the old members are replaced by new ones. Such superpersonalities are not nonexistent, but they lead a life of their own. Although corporations are said to have no souls, each one is possessed of a definite character, and different corporations differ in dignity and other qualities as much as do individuals.

It is important for us to understand the significance of superpersonalities because without a due appreciation of them we cannot understand either religion or patriotism. Superpersonalities live in ideals and it is by no means indifferent in what way groups of persons are associated together. Superpersonal interrelations in politics are of great consequence, and it is very important how citizens are united into states, whether in the shape of a republic, or an absolute monarchy, or a constitutional government, and every form of a national constitution has the tendency of self-preservation which, however, is subject to modification through natural growth—sometimes through revolution.

There ought to be founded a special branch of psychology to determine the constitution, logic and sentiments of superpersonal presences. To some extent, but not altogether, it would be identical with, or at least similar to, the psychology of the masses. We must bear in mind that the psychological aspect of a superpersonal presence consists in certain brain structures distributed over a greater or less number of persons who are inspired with the same or similar principles and tendencies, and so they cooperate in more or less clearly defined concerted actions.

We may define a superpersonal presence as a systematic set of ideas which form a higher unity, and there are great varieties of such systems of ideas. If they enter into his-

tory as dominant principles we speak of them as "historical movements." If they take shape in visible form, if buildings and property are set aside for their uses, or if in their interest duties are assigned to officers, we speak of them as "institutions"; if they are types set forth for imitation we call them "ideals," and if they are chartered by law and have their functions duly determined they become "juridical persons." At any rate they differ greatly in dignity and may be as flippant in character as a bridge-club, or as serious as a church, or as awe-inspiring as a god of pagan antiquity.

It is typical of the human mind to personify these superpersonal presences; and so the powers, phenomena, and laws of nature, such as the thunderstorm, the sun, the moon, the sky, the ocean, etc., and also the factors of human society, courage, wisdom, science, war, are represented in poetic figures as Zeus, Athene, Vulcan, Mars, Venus and the other gods of the pagan pantheons. These conceptions have been as influential in the life of the several nations as if they had been living beings guiding and directing those who believed in their existence. In this sense we must look upon them not as mere fiction, but as real and definite agencies whose nature is of higher consequence than even historical personalities, leaders in peace and war, and law-givers.

On the other hand there are historical personages who change, or at any rate are transfigured, after death into superpersonal presences. The mortal coil is shuffled off and they become paragons of the virtue or the ideal which in some way or other they have come to represent. This idealization of historical persons takes place everywhere in history, and we can observe the process even now. Bismarck has become the Paladin of German unity and it was quite appropriate to represent him in a colossal statue as the figure of the mythical Roland. In the United States

Washington has received a similar veneration and the same happens over and over again in all climes and countries. Even a living man still dwelling with us in the body may be dignified by coming to stand for a superpersonal idea. Alexander the Great very adroitly had himself worshiped as the son of the god Ammon and even in his coins he carries the ram's horns which symbolize this belief. Napoleon instinctively, perhaps purposely and shrewdly, imitated his example and managed to have the press of the day picture and characterize him as a kind of reincarnation of Cæsar.

As a rule, however, a person is thus dignified only after his death. Indeed he frequently comes to be revered as such a superpersonal ideal by suffering martyrdom for a great cause. And Schiller says truly:

“Denn was ewig im Gesang soll leben,
Muss auf Erden untergehen.”

[What shall live in song forever
That must perish here on earth.]

The figures of the polytheistic gods are but little appreciated to-day. Historians in ancient Greece and in modern times have investigated whether or not Heracles existed, where he may have lived, and whether there is any historical nucleus of his labors. At the time when paganism broke down people began to doubt the historicity of Heracles. Then this superpersonal figure of the Greek hero began to fade in the memory of the people. Such is the death of superpersonalities. The hero died and was supplanted by other ideals offered in the growth of a new religion called Christianity.

During the prime of Greek civilization, Heracles was by no means a nonentity. He was an important factor in the intellectual and moral life of Greece. He moulded the character of young men. He inspired them with motives of high courage and other virtues, and in the same way

all of the gods must be regarded as superpersonalities who were no mean presences in the life of the nation where they prevailed.

From such considerations we must also approach the superpersonalities of the Christian faith, especially the figure of Christ. From this standpoint we shall understand that in a certain sense and for the main purpose, which is the inspiring influence of the Christ ideal in the hearts of believers, it is quite indifferent whether or not Jesus was an historical person.

Jesus the Galilean who lived nineteen centuries ago in an obscure corner of Palestine can be of no possible use to us unless he becomes a real presence in our lives, and this means that he must be raised to the power and dignity of a superpersonality—of an ideal which to the dull eye of the uninitiated seems to be a mere nonentity, but is in truth a guidance for our conduct and a dominating factor in our lives.

* * *

The God of Christianity has supplanted the ancient gods of paganism, and we can understand why he has been so much more potent than they. He does not represent one or another power of nature. He stands for the totality of all that exists and also the creative faculty which has produced the world and continues to mould it. The Church Fathers, as well as the Christian philosophers who succeeded them, especially Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, worked out the doctrine of Christian philosophy. They gave considerable thought to the idea of personality, and after many internal struggles finally shaped the conception of this highest superpersonal presence in the doctrine of the Trinity, or more properly speaking Tri-Unity, of God. The orthodox churches insist most vigorously on the dogma that God

is one and only one, but at the same time that there is in God a trinity of persons, which means that the deity manifests itself in three modes and each mode constitutes a unity in itself.

It is well known that the Buddhists too believe in a Trinity which consists of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, i. e., (1) the Enlightened Teacher, (2) the Truth, and (3) the Brotherhood or Church. It is called the *Triratna* or the "three jewels," and is conceived as three personalities, called the *Trikâya*, or in Chinese 三身 *san shan*. Not unlike the Christian Trinity, the three persons of the Buddhist *Trikâya* represent the three phases or aspects of God, or whatever we may call the object of religious worship.

In the Mahayâna doctrine the three *kâyas* are thus described: the Dharmakâya, the body of the good law, is the system of all religious doctrines; the Nirmanakâya or the body of transformations, is the development of truth in the evolution of life finding its climax in the personality of a Buddha; and the Sambhogakâya, the body of perfect bliss, is the eternal world-order, the sum total of all the verities of natural and moral laws which dominate all existence, whose revelation is the Dharma and whose incarnation in human form is called the Enlightened One, the Buddha, he who has found the truth and teaches it.

The Sambhogakâya is, as it were, the static aspect of God, while the two others are dynamic. The Nirmanakâya is kinetic and the Dharmakâya potential; and all three are one and the same,—just as energy remains the same in all its phases and transformations.

The Sambhogakâya corresponds to God the Father in Christian doctrine, and from him proceed both the Nirmanakâya, and the Dharmakâya; the three are one and the same, though each of them is conceived as a personality (*kâya*) of his own, and the three are present in their human

incarnation in the Buddha. The Buddha represents the eternal truth of the world; he teaches the right religious doctrines, and he is the climax of the evolution of truth in life.

It is interesting to notice that in spite of the abstract and philosophical tone of the Buddhist doctrine of the Trinity, the need of personifying the highest religious authority finds an expression in the term *Trikâya* (or in Chinese, *san shan*), i. e., "the three persons," and notwithstanding many fundamental differences, this doctrine is similar to the orthodox conception of the Christian Trinity.

According to Christian theology, God has three aspects. God is, above all, the Eternal, the Law that molds existence, the ultimate *raison d'être* which remains the same for ever and aye, and in the nomenclature of theology is called "God the Father." But this abstract being which is without beginning and without end manifests itself in the actually realized world. It appears as the working world-order called by Greek Christians the *Logos* and finds its consummation in the appearance of the ideal man, the God-man or Christ, and in this aspect is called "God the Son." It manifests itself in life as the superpersonal ideal of a human person, the incarnation of truth and righteousness, but since this ideal is foredetermined in the constitution of being, its principle is co-eternal with God the Father, and thus the doctrine is upheld that Christ is begotten of God from eternity, being as it were the *Logos* of the actual world, and it is stated that the world is created through the Son.

The third person of the Godhead is less clearly defined and for a time it was doubtful how the Holy Ghost ought to be conceived. A Trinity of some kind was needed for both historical and logical reasons. All duality is inharmonious and tends to find its solution in a third element, viz., in a combination of the two-hood. In some pre-

Christian religions the Trinity was made up of the members of the threehood of the family, i. e., God-Father, God-Mother and God-Child, as for instance Osiris, Isis, Horus. But in other religions there were other trinities which did not find a prototype in the human family but were of a more abstract, sometimes more physical, sometimes more logical, nature. Thus we have in Babylon Anu, Ea and Bel; in India Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva; in ancient Etruria Tinia, Thalma and Menrva.

Among certain heretical sects the Holy Ghost was conceived as the Mother of Christ, but this conception was not accepted by the Church. We must remember that the Hebrew word '*ruah*' is of feminine gender, and among some of the Græco-Egyptian gnostics was replaced by *Sophia*, a feminine conception of wisdom. Later on the term Ghost was translated by *pneuma* which is neuter, and since the humanization of the conception of God in the shape of father, mother and child was scorned as pagan, the Holy Ghost was finally treated as a kind of neuter element in the orthodox conception of God.

The Holy Ghost is, as it were, God in the making. It is God as the divine dispensation; it is the advance movement in the development of mankind, the justice of history, the power which makes for righteousness, and thus we have the seeming contradiction in church dogmas that Christ was begotten through the Holy Ghost, not directly by God the Father; and that the Holy Ghost proceeds at the same time from both God the Father and God the Son.

The Holy Ghost being God in the making, i. e., the divine dispensation of history, forms a unity in itself which is the principle of evolution reaching its climax in the ideal of the God-man. At the same time it is the good will as established in the new dispensation, in the kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ.

That such is the underlying logic of the doctrine of the

Trinity can scarcely be doubted, although most arguments and explanations have been formulated more instinctively than with clear philosophical insight and logic.

* * *

In a certain sense the Christian God-conception is as much a superpersonal presence in the minds of the people as were the pagan deities whom it supplanted. But after all there is in Christianity an aspect of the conception of God which is higher and which comes to the surface if we dig down to the bottom rock on which rests this grandest thought which the religious consciousness of man has been able to produce. The purpose of the God-conception is to represent that universal and eternal presence which shapes existence in its totality and in every detail; it denotes that reality in which we live and move and have our being, the ultimate authority of right and wrong, the standard of truth and error and the eternal norm of all existence, and the idea of this omnipresence is a superpersonality in the highest sense of the word.

Is such a conception a mere illusion, or does it represent some actuality? And here we will say that the facts of experience compel us to grant that the religious instinct of man has assuredly not been misguided on this point. The formulation of the deity as an individual being, its personification, its humanization, and the childish notions connected with it, the idea that God is like ourselves, an egotistical, vainglorious and imperious person, are superstitions which naturally arise in immature minds. But the underlying truth of it, that there is a norm of existence, that the nature of right and wrong, truth and error and the general lawdom of cosmic existence can be definitely determined, cannot be denied, for our very existence as rational beings, the possibility of science, the actuality of human reason, the reliability of logical argument, the fact

that we are ensouled with moral aspirations, the gist of human life and its significance, bear testimony to it. All these phenomena, so important in our experience, prove that there is an eternal norm, and this norm which in our lives becomes the authority of conduct is God.

In a certain sense God is supernatural, for the world-order of which we can reconstruct the purely formal features in pure mathematics and logic, is the condition not only of this actual world of ours but of any possible world. It applies not only to nature as we know it from experience, but to any possible nature whether it exists in spheres unknown or merely in dreams. Its validity is without exception; it does not contradict nature but, in this sense, it is above nature—it is supernatural.

This supernatural God constitutes a system of norms, and whenever we try to formulate them in clear rules or theorems such as those propounded in mathematics, these eternal norms are seen to be a system, and constitute a unity so as to be comparable to an organism of which all parts are organs whose functions are fully understood only when considered in their cooperation. They are co- and sub- and superordinated parts, and their significance appears only when considered in their unity. In this sense God bears a close resemblance to a person and in this sense only we may speak of the personality of God, for we must bear in mind that God is not an individual or a person as is man. The personality of man is temporal; the personality of God is eternal. Man's thoughts are consecutive, God's thoughts are the truths which neither originate nor pass away; they are the laws of nature, the determinant factors of all that happens. The thoughts of man are discursive phases of reasoning. They are centered around his ego, and they are subject to error. There is no ego in God, and his thoughts, being eternal, are infallible, and the potency of their application is unailing.

Man has developed into a person, into a rational being capable of searching for the truth and following definite purposes, because the world is dominated by a consistency of being which mirrors itself as universal law, and in this sense man, the incarnation of reason, has been shaped by the world order, and it may fitly be said that he has been created in the image of God. While man is like unto God we may in poetic language personify God as if he were like unto man, but in fact he partakes in no wise of man's limitations; he bears no features of transient individuality but is eternal and omnipresent while man is concrete, local, and transitory.

The difference of God's personality, or rather superpersonality, is not in degree but in kind. As Yahveh, the God of Israel, says in Isaiah lv. 8-9, "My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. . . For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."

There is one more reason why the term superpersonal can with special propriety be applied to God, and it almost eclipses all others, and contains all of them. It is this, that God—the superpersonal God as here described—is the prototype of all personality. The character of the universe the constitution of the cosmos, its inmost being and significance reveals itself better and more completely in a person than in any other object of creation, and so we may conclude with the statement to be interpreted in the light of the foregoing expositions, that every person in the measure that he attains the ideal of personality is a revelation of God.

* * *

The mystic standpoint in its most modern formulation is represented by F. Max Müller, but though it finds adherents to-day among spiritists, theosophists and other rep-

representatives of the New Thought movement, it is a well-established view among many orthodox people, not only of Christianity but of any religious system of the world. In truth, it is as old as mankind and was worked out for the first time by the Vedanta philosophers of ancient India, and summarized by Shankara Charya. We reject this view in its extreme formulation and have pointed out that it is based upon the error of reifying the unity of a compound thing. The unity of a thing is the combination of its parts, not a mysterious thing in itself. There is not a metaphysical entity called "wind" who performs the function of "blowing," who causes the commotion of the air, but this commotion of the air, the blowing of the wind, is the wind itself. In the same way the cooperation of all the organs is the organism. There is not an organism in itself, there is not a life principle, or a metaphysical self (called atman by the Vedanta philosopher) which animates the several organs, but the cooperation of all the organs produces that organized whole which we call the entire organism. The organs have originated through a differentiation of function and in their combination they produce a higher unity. It is true enough that a unity existed before, for instance first in the undivided cell, but the higher unity, or generally stated the gradation of the unity of an organism from a lower to a higher range, is always a product or an effect, not a cause; it is due to the cooperation of its parts. It is therefore wrong to assume a mysterious entity or a metaphysical essence which constitutes the unities of things and assumes a mysterious principle to account for the non-material interrelations of parts which produce new and higher unities.

Turning to the other side, we are confronted with a theory that disregards the significance of pure form and would accept only materiality as real and significant. The materialist who in judging of the value of a statue would

only take cognizance of the metal of which it is made and who would measure its worth by taking its weight, disregarding its shape and showing no appreciation for its beauty, is incapable of seeing that the combination of several factors produces a new thing. Three lines crossing are not three lines but constitute a triangle with all its wonderful complications with which we become acquainted as geometry and trigonometry, and the same is true of all combinations. The whole intellectual world with all its wonders rises from combinations of very simple and elementary factors of feelings, and the final result is that wonderful product which we call personality in which the eternal laws of being are reflected.

While appreciating the significance of form and formal laws as developed in pure logic and pure mathematics and not accepting any mystical theory of the universe, we nevertheless comprehend the significance of purely formal laws and understand what mystics mean when they are overawed by the profundity of the significance of unity, of that mysterious item which produces new values through a mere combination of parts. Therefore we deem it not inappropriate to use the terms of religious conceptions, such as God, soul, and immortality, but it will be noticed that all the religious terms thus employed and thus justified find a rigorously scientific explanation.

We anticipate that the extremists on both sides will be little satisfied with our methods, but we are confident that those representatives of either party who see deeper will join us, and in the propositions here presented they will find the true solution of an old problem that has vexed mankind for millenniums.

Readers somewhat acquainted with the history of philosophy will notice that the treatment of the idea of personality here attempted constitutes a reconciliation between the two opposed views, the mystico-religious interpreta-

tion of facts, and the rigidly scientific conception, either of which in its extreme formulation must be regarded as contradictory to the other. We claim that both, if rightly understood, come to the same conclusion, so they are complementary, the one to the other, and emphasize two truths—two truths which form a contrast without being contradictory to each other, each of which by itself being one-sided, and so the two demand each other for the sake of completeness.

EDITOR.